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Only time will tell to what extent the electoral victory of the nationalist New Flemish Alliance 
[N-VA] in 2010 and the institutional crisis that followed were a turning point in the political 
emancipation of Flanders. But it is clear that times have changed and the end of the Belgian 
state is no longer considered a piece of political science fiction. Nevertheless, the Left in 
Flanders continues to behave as it always has for over a century during which it has defined 
the demand for greater Flemish independence as a right-wing project that deserves no 
sympathy from social democrats. Why is that? 
Bad Timing 
Nation formation as such is not a right-wing project. In the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, when most of the 
European nations emerged, nationalism was often an emancipating force directed against the Ancien 
Régime in favour of equal rights for all citizens. In the 20
th
 century, nationalism was one of the driving 
forces behind decolonisation, directed  against the exploitation of non-Western societies.  
Nation formation and nationalism must be seen in their historical context. The Czech historian, 
Miroslav Hroch’s model of nationalism offers a framework that throws light on why the Left has not 
played an active role in Flemish Nationalism. Hroch developed his theory of small nation-formation in 
the 1960s. Wider academic acclaim followed after an English translation appeared in the 1980s
1
 and 
the validity of his model is now universally accepted. According to Hroch, the Flemish nation can be 
considered historically as a ‘small nation’ within the territory of ‘large’ – i.e. dominant – Belgian nation. 
For a long time, Flemish language and culture had been subordinated to a dominant francophone 
Belgian culture. The Flemish movement wanted to change all that and combined its cultural struggle 
with a campaign to create a  greater sense of unity among the Flemish. Its significance and impact 
has been determined to a large extent by how far it could appeal to the labour movement. Indeed, that 
will ultimately be the decisive factor in the successful creation, or otherwise, of a Flemish nation. 
The degree to which the labour movement commits itself to the goals of the small-nation builders 
depends on the timing of the political and social changes associated with  the collapse of the Ancien 
Régime and the rise of industrial capitalism. Three stages can be distinguished: stage 1, the struggle 
against the Ancien Régime through civil and social revolution and the rise of industrial capitalism; 
stage 2, the breakthrough of industrial capitalism and the emergence of the working class; stage 3, 
when economic expansion occurs and mass communications become important. The process of 
national transformation which the devotees of small nations have in mind also has three phases. 
Phase A, when a small group of passionate intellectuals take an interest in the culture of the small 
nation; phase B, when intense nationalist agitation is sustained by associations, periodicals, national 
congresses etc.; phase C, in which the national movement is consolidated and integrates the working 
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class. Depending on the time in which the three phases of national transformation develop in relation 
to the stages of social and political change, different types of national movement will result.  
The activists of the Flemish movement had to deal with bad timing. The transition from phase A to B 
occurred after the industrial and bourgeois revolutions were completed, and the transition from phase 
B to C happened after the rise of an organised labour movement had taken place in the territory of the 
dominant nation. According to Hroch, that was why the formation of the small Flemish nation could 
not be completed and why it remained subordinated to the larger nation.  
Labour Movement and Flemish Movement 
Hroch’s analysis raises the question how the Flemish Movement related to the labour movement and 
the struggle for social and political rights. The first generation of Flemish ‘language lovers’ 
[taalminnaars] as they were called, showed more interest in philology than in the social conditions of 
the Flemish population. Also after 1840 when the Flemish Movement became politicised – the 
transition to Hroch’s phase B – a deep gulf remained between the demands of the linguistic 
campaigners and the social needs of the people. The linguistic demands primarily reflected the 
immediate concerns of the largely lower middle class Flemish activists themselves. In their daily 
activities as teachers, lecturers, office workers, minor civil servants and clerics they were confronted 
by a mainly French dominated society and often had ‘shop floor’ experience of French-speaking 
competitors who would walk off with the better jobs.  
In theory, there were enough points of contact for the Flemish Movement to link the language issue 
with a package of socio-economic demands. The Belgian economy was developing at different 
speeds and Wallonia in particular had been able to benefit from industrialisation. This opened up the 
possibility of giving the language campaign a social dimension that would have made it attractive to 
the labour movement. The conditions were therefore present for the consolidation of the national 
movement (phase C) to coincide with the development of the labour movement. However, the petty 
bourgeois Flemish Movement turned its back on the social struggle. Most of them were Catholic and 
had strongly conservative and paternalistic views on social issues. They saw their fight for the 
Flemish language as part of a Catholic programme designed  to protect the people from the ideas of 
the French revolution. The Catholic Flemish movement defined itself as the catalyst of a Flemish 
social movement and a bulwark against socialism.  
When the Belgian Workers Party (BWP), a well-organised socialist party, was founded in 1885 it 
assumed that it would operate within a Belgian framework in spite of its internationalist programme. It 
was outspokenly hostile to the middle-class Flemish movement which they criticised for remaining 
neutral in the struggle for greater social and political rights.  
Nevertheless, Flemish socialist workers did identify with Flanders and supported the Flemish 
movement’s demands for ‘dutchification’. This was shown by some interesting research by historian 
Maarten Van Ginderachter.
2
 After the BWP had exacted universal suffrage in 1893, there was 
increasing interest in Dutch as means of political communication. Partly because of that, the Flemish 
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Movement at the end of the nineteenth century had grown into a broad, social movement with enough 
representation to give it political weight. The conditions for integrating the Flemish and labour 
movements also became more favourable. Antagonism between Flanders and Wallonia was 
becoming sharper. Little progress was made in granting equal rights to Dutch speakers. Although the 
official recognition of Dutch as of equal standing to French in 1898 [Gelijkheidswet] made it 
theoretically possible to establish bilingualism throughout Belgium, it encountered fierce resistance 
from French speakers. A Walloon movement emerged in defence of the French-speaking integrity of 
Wallonia, which also demanded the retention of bilingualism in Flanders. Active members of the 
movement in Flanders demanded the right to continue to operate in French as before. They were 
usually middle management and white collar workers in language-sensitive sectors. The campaign for 
French language facilities in Flanders and the denial of the same rights to Dutch speakers in Wallonia 
was seen by the Flemish movement as fundamentally unjust and led to the demand that Flanders 
should become entirely Dutch-speaking. Because French was still regarded as an essential 
characteristic of the Belgian nation, that was perceived by the Belgian elites as a threat to the 
country’s unity. This elitist perception was not entirely unfounded. The Flemish Movement’s transition 
from a pressure group wanting linguistic equality to a movement striving for monolingualism within a 
clearly defined region (Flanders) belonging to the ‘Flemish people’ was, after all, a major step in the 
direction of Flemish nationalism (which in the long run might rival that of the Belgian nation). 
Boundaries, literally and figuratively, have a fundamental significance for the process of national 
identity. The added territorial dimension put down markers for the Flemish nation and turned the 
Flemish Movement into a genuinely national movement. However, real consolidation would require it 
to be integrated with the labour movement.  
The power of the people 
The territorial element made up only a part of a process of ideological deepening and enrichment. The 
Flemish Movement evolved from a linguistic movement into a movement with a broad social 
programme expressed in national terms. The process was influenced by fundamental social changes 
that provided opportunities as well as dangers for the cause. On the one hand, there was the so-
called second industrial revolution which led to the growth of industrial activity in Flanders and the 
expansion of the service and transport sectors. On the other, there were social and political changes, 
such as democratisation and the rise of the ‘social question’ which the pro-Flemish used to link 
language rights to a socio-economic programme. Discrimination against the Dutch language was 
given as one reason why Flanders was trailing socio-economically and offered a potential point of 
contact with the social democrats. However, the opportunity was not taken because the Flemish 
Movement had an agenda that was aimed explicitly at class reconciliation and social pacification. By 
removing the social barriers created by language, a future Dutch-speaking elite would contribute to 
the social integration of the Flemish people. ‘Bloodletting’, such as the massive outflow of Flemish 
paupers to the industrial centres in France and Wallonia, had to be stopped in order to maximise the 
power of the Flemish people, with an eye to future Flemish economic domination within the Belgian 
state. This vision of class reconciliation within an organic, corporatively structured Flemish community 
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under elite leadership fitted the existing elite’s broader fears of dislocation in the wake of 
industrialisation, agricultural crisis and democratisation
3
. 
But the Flemish Movement could not simply be reduced to an instrument of class reconciliation. The 
Flemish programme appealed to the social aspirations of important groups in society who had to 
confront continually the experience of language inequality. For these groups, the struggle for their 
own language signified genuine emancipation. Socio-economic developments during the Belle 
Époque ensured that the social appeal of the Flemish Movement was greatly broadened. The second 
industrial revolution brought an expansion of industrial activity in Flanders and growth in the service 
and transport sectors. That created a class of Flemish white collar workers who in language-sensitive  
areas experienced language discrimination on the shop floor as well as competition from immigrant 
Walloon middle management. This meant that on the eve of the First World War, the Flemish 
Movement had long ceased to be a network of ‘language lovers’. The struggle for the recognition of 
Dutch had fanned a sense of solidarity among the Flemish who identified themselves with the 
language. There were also leaders and militants within the BWP who actively gave a Flemish twist to 
their policies. The pre-war alliance with pro-Flemish liberals and Catholics to make Ghent a Dutch-
language university shows that they were even prepared to step outside their ideological differences 
in order to promote the Flemish Movement. But Flemish (sub)nationalism developed most strongly 
among the Catholics. In ideological terms they felt most comfortable when intertwining their pro-
Flemish feelings with (social) Catholicism, based on a shared belief in class reconciliation.  
Here is our blood; where are our rights? 
Wars create but they can also destroy nations. In the history of the Belgian nation the First World War 
provided an important momentum. With the German invasion of 1914, the people of Belgium 
experienced a major war for the first time in their history. It was a litmus test for Belgian solidarity. 
Originally the paths of the Flemish Movement and Belgian socialism ran parallel. Both political 
movements rallied behind the Belgian fatherland both on the front and under occupation. Socialists 
and Flemish activists alike presumed that a grateful fatherland would meet their political demands. 
Universal suffrage and a Dutch-speaking Flanders were the least that Belgium owed them. But in both 
cases, counter-movements developed that broke the national consensus. So-called ‘minority 
socialists’ placed the international solidarity of the working class above the war between nations and 
campaigned for an end to the war. However, their influence was limited and  the nomination of the 
BWP’s chairman as a Minister of State in 1914 clinched the ‘Sacred Union’ and the input of the 
socialists. Through the influential national Commission for Help and Nourishment [Hulp- en 
Voedingscomité], which had branches in every district, socialist organisations were able, often for the 
first time, to gain some influence in Flanders.  
Within the Flemish Movement, under pressure from the German occupiers, a movement arose that 
was prepared to break with the Belgian fatherland to achieve Flemish demands. In particular, when 
Ghent University was made Dutch-speaking in 1916 a number of Flemish activists were persuaded to 
cross the line. Even on the Front some of the pro-Flemish were radicalised and an anti-Belgian 
                                                     
3 D. Luyten, ‘Economie’, in: Nieuwe Encyclopedie van de Vlaamse Beweging, Tielt, 1998, pp. 1028-1031. 
Verschenen in: W. Vermeersch (ed.), The Flemish Left amidst a Nationalist Surge (Belgian Society 
and Politics 2011), Ghent:  Gerrit Kreveld Foundation & Samenleving en Politiek, pp. 47-55 
 
movement arose demanding ‘Home Rule’ for Flanders. Both on the front and at home these Flemish 
radicals formed a small minority. But their impact in the long run was considerable because, unlike the 
minority socialists in the BWP, they created a permanent break. That was mainly a consequence of 
the way in which the Belgian political elite reacted to the Flemish challenge. Whereas immediately 
after the war the BWP was able to obtain universal suffrage and carry out some of its social 
programme, the Flemish Movement was left empty-handed. Flemish militants who had remained loyal 
to Belgium, shared the odium of treason. This created a fertile soil in which anti-Belgian Flemish 
nationalism could flourish. The fate of a group of pro-Flemish soldiers at the Front, trudging through 
the mud of the Ijzer valley, gave an existential significance to Flemish nationalism. ‘Idealistic Flanders’ 
engaged against a Belgium that had dishonoured the ‘Flemish sacrifice’ in the interests of the French-
speakers. ‘Here is our blood, where are our rights?’ became a powerful and mobilising slogan 
whereby even convicted collaborators might be exonerated.  
Social democracy between Flemish nation-formation and extreme right-wing Flemish 
nationalism 
The implementation of universal suffrage for men and the fact that in government the BWP was able 
to push through important social legislation, deepened and broadened the identification of the socialist 
rank and file with the Belgian nation state. But in Flanders, the process was complicated by the 
Flemish Movement. According to the Leuven historian, Lode Wils, the rejection by the post-war 
governments of greater equality for Dutch was a fatal blow to the continued loyalty of the Dutch-
speaking population to a unitary Belgium. 70% of the war dead had been Flemish, yet they were 
denied equality.
4
 It generated a pro-Flemish undercurrent among the population which the Belgian 
centres of power failed to recognise sufficiently.  
That Flemish public opinion was in turmoil is illustrated by the fact that in 1928 in an Antwerp by-
election, the voters elected a collaborator who had been condemned to death. It not only reflected the 
bitterness about the continuing inequalities but also showed that Flanders was taking precedence 
over Belgium. That sentiment particularly affected the Catholic population in Flanders. Flemish 
heroism at the Front had been bathed in Christian mysticism. The connection between Flemish nation 
formation and Catholicism was strikingly expressed in the motto: ‘All for Flanders – Flanders for 
Christ’ that was placed on the graves of Flemish soldiers who had died at the Front. Lode Wils 
ascribes an important role to the Flemish Christian democrats who saw in the Flemish nation a 
mobilising potential for attracting the support of Flemish workers. Phase C of Hroch’s model – the 
consolidation of the national movement – was completed, even though it was limited to the 
overwhelmingly Catholic population of Flanders. With the backing of the General Christian Workers 
Union, Flanders in the 1930s saw linguistic equality established by law and Dutch was made 
obligatory in all the major social domains.  
In principle the socialist BWP was in favour of a monolingual Flanders, although for a short time it was 
prepared to consider Flemish francophones as a historical minority with a right to cultural autonomy. 
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This was laid down in the so-called ‘Compromise of the Belgians’ which francophone and Flemish 
socialists produced in 1929 on the language question. But in the 1930s a new generation of Flemish 
socialists developed a more explicitly Flemish profile. In 1937 a Congress of Flemish socialists argued 
for cultural autonomy, and even in non-cultural matters the Flemish socialists developed different 
policies from their French-speaking and Walloon comrades. Everything indicated that a process of  
nation formation was taking place among the socialist rank and file.  
The electoral popularity of anti-Belgian Flemish nationalism must also have played a part, but its 
impact was ambiguous. Flemish nationalism developed into an anti-democratic movement with 
undisguised sympathy for the Fascist New Order. It strove for a right-wing front against socialism, 
which it stigmatised as an ally of Communism. In this way it was able to challenge the Catholics not 
only in their pro-Flemish sympathies but also in their right-wing ideology, leading in 1936 to a split in 
the Catholic Party along language lines and the creation of a right-wing cartel for the elections of 
1938. This further emphasised the fundamental ideological differences between socialism and anti-
Belgian Flemish nationalism. While Flemish nationalists linked their dream of nationhood to the 
horrors of national socialism, the socialists committed themselves in the resistance to an explicit 
Belgian nationalism. It became a blood-drenched conflict. On both sides, families mourned the 
premature loss of relatives in the violence of war, either as members of the resistance or as 
collaborators on the German front or the so-called ‘home front’. It created a mutual aversion between 
the two sides which was perpetuated after the war by the political disagreements over whether the 
Belgian king should be allowed back on the throne. Leopold III, who had attempted to strike a 
compromise with Hitler during the occupation, became the subject of a confrontation between Left 
and Right. But the right-wing Flemish majority of over 70% had to surrender to the left-wing anti-
Leopold camp which was quickly branded as ‘Walloon’. In that context Flemish nationalism attempted 
to excuse its national-socialist past as an act of desperation provoked by an anti-Flemish Belgian 
state. It prevented any serious examination of political conscience and allowed former collaborators to 
play an important part in post-war Flemish nationalism, which with the Volksunie [Peoples Union, VU] 
enjoyed an electoral revival after 1960. For many socialists this confirmed their suspicion that the 
Peoples Union was no more than a party of collaborators.  
From unitary BSP to socialists in Flanders
5
 
The experience of the Second World War slowed down the process of Flemish nation formation. The 
injection of Belgian patriotism had raised the prospect of a revived Belgian nation state. Belgian 
socialism became a buttress of a unitary Belgium. The Belgian Socialist Party (BSP) became a party of 
government and from within government was able to build up a system of social security. A neo-
Keynesian welfare state with an important role for the trade unions and mutual benefit societies 
was continued within a Belgian framework. Nevertheless, it was not long before inter-community 
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issues were back on the party agenda. This time the impetus came from Wallonia where the 
Walloon Popular Movement (MPW), a left-wing regional movement, was formed in response to 
economic developments that saw Flanders enjoy an economic boom while Walloon industry 
suffered a structural crisis. The MPW demanded Walloon-oriented socio-economic policies. On the 
Flemish side there was also a revival of regionalism, but mainly in the demand for an administrative 
level dealing with culture and language. The Belgian Socialist Party (BSP) adjusted to this. Already in 
the 1960s the Flemish and Walloon federations were holding separate congresses and in 1971 after 
the first Belgian constitutional reform the party introduced a dual presidency. At the end of the 
1970s the Flemish socialists made common cause with the other Flemish parties, a development 
which the Walloon federations could not accept. In 1978 they set up their own Parti Socialiste (PS) 
thereby breaking up the BSP. In 1980 the Socialistische Partij (SP) was founded. Although the 
proposal to include the word ‘Flemish’ in the name was rejected, the identification with Flanders 
kept raising its head. It was not made easier by the emergence of a new extreme right-wing Flemish-
nationalist party, which drained away the SP’s supporters with a xenophobic programme directed 
against Moroccan and Turkish immigrants. The Flemish Bloc [Vlaams Blok] attracted more voters 
than the SP in the Federal and Flemish elections of 1999. A decade later the Flemish Bloc was in turn 
overshadowed by another new party, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), a successor to the Peoples 
Union [Volksunie], in one of the biggest electoral upsets in Belgian history. In 2010, N-VA won nearly 
30% of the Flemish vote with an anti-Belgian, centre-right programme. Taken together with the 
Flemish Bloc, over 40% of the Flemish electorate support separatism, while support for the Flemish 
social democrats has reached an all-time low. The party stands at the crossroads. Should it accept 
Flemish nation formation and wholeheartedly embrace a Flemish state with a left-wing programme? 
Or will it become the standard bearer for the reconstruction of Belgian solidarity? If the latter, it will 
be a long and arduous road. 
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